










































The draft judgments convention and its relationship with other
international instruments
Citation for published version:
Noodt Taquela, MB & Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V 2018, 'The draft judgments convention and its relationship with
other international instruments', Yearbook of Private International Law, vol. 19 (2017/2018) , pp. 449-474.
https://doi.org/10.9785/9783504386078
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.9785/9783504386078
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Yearbook of Private International Law
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: 'The Draft Judgments convention and its' relationship with
other international instruments', Noodt Taquela, María Blanca, Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Veronica , which has been
published in final form at: https://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/502347
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. Nov. 2019
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 19 (2017/2018), pp. 217-242 
© Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt & Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
Printed in Germany 
THE DRAFT JUDGMENTS CONVENTION AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
María Blanca Noodt Taquela*/ Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm** 
I. Introduction
II. “The Dialogue of the Sources”
III. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
IV. “Coordination Clauses” or “Compatibility Clauses”
V. Different Types of Coordination Clauses





F. Incompatibility/ Denunciation Clauses
G. Disconnection Clauses: Regionalism v Universalism
VI. The Developing Coordination Provisions in the Draft Convention
A. Possibility of Application of National Law (Article 16)
B. “Dialogue of the Sources” (Article 24)
C. Relation with Prior Instruments
D. Relation with Posterior Instruments
E. Disconnection Clause (with EU Regulations)
F. Priorities Enabled by Declarations?
VII. What is Missing in the Draft Convention?
VIII. The Draft Convention and the MERCOSUR Legal Landscape




* Professor of Private International Law, University of Buenos Aires. This article is
one of the outputs of the UBACyT project “La cooperación jurisdiccional internacional 
como piedra angular de un nuevo concepto del Derecho internacional privado”, 
20020150100116BA, developed with the financial support of the University of Buenos 
Aires. 
** Senior Lecturer in International Private Law, University of Edinburgh. This 
article is one of the outputs of the PILIM project (http://www.pilim.law.ed.ac.uk) funded by 
the British Academy. The authors would like to thank the British Academy for the financial 
support to the project.  
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 19 (2017/2018) 218 
María Blanca Noodt Taquela / Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm 
I. Introduction
The “Judgments Project” refers to the work done, since 1992, by The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law (hereinafter, “The Hague Conference”), 
the international organisation for cross-border cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters. The Hague Conference has long pursued the ambitious goal of 
producing a potentially worldwide convention that could provide, on a much larger 
scale, the benefits of systematic recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
presently found in the European Union. Initially, the Hague Conference sought to 
develop a “double convention”1 on international jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. However, lack of consensus 
between the Hague Conference Members,2 mostly on the appropriate approach to 
issues of jurisdiction, ultimately required the original project to be scaled 
down, and led to the conclusion of the Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements of 30 June 2005.3 In 2012, the Council on General Affairs and Policy 
of The Hague Conference decided to relaunch the work on the Judgments Project4 
and relatively soon, in this second attempt at the project,5 the idea of a “double 
convention” was abandoned. The 
1 For the concept of single, double and mixed conventions see A. T. VON MEHREN, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for The Hague 
Conference?, (1994) 57 Law & Contemporary Problems 271; ID., Theory and practice of 
adjudicatory authority in private international law: a comparative study of the doctrine, 
policies and practices of common and civil law systems: General course on private 
international law, Recueil des cours, vol 295 (2002), 9-432. 
2 The Hague Conference currently has 83 Members: 82 States and 1 Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation, the European Union. For an overview of the 
Membership evolution see https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members, last accessed on 
28 March 2018. 
3 The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements adopted on June 30th 2005 
entered into force on October 1st 2015 and at the time of writing Mexico, the European 
Union (except Denmark) and Singapore are parties to the Convention. Available on: 
https://www.hcch.net. 
4 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (17 to 20 
April 2012); Conclusion and Recommendation No 16, and Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Experts’ Group on Possible Future Work on Cross-border 
Litigation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Work. Doc. No 2 of April 2012 for the 
attention of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference. 
5 Between 2012 and 2015, a Working Group was constituted. It met five times and 
completed its work on a proposed draft text in November 2015 (first phase). Afterwards, the 
Council decided to convene a Special Commission, where all the Members could be 
represented, and where international organisations and stakeholders could also participate as 
observers, to prepare a draft Convention (second phase). Four Special Commission meetings 
took place at The Hague in June 2016, February 2017, November 2017 and May 2018. The 
resulting draft Convention (‘the May 2018 draft Convention’) will be presented to the 
HCCH Council at its March 2019 meeting with a view to the adoption of the Convention at 
a Diplomatic Conference in mid 2019. 
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focus since then has been on the adoption of a convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments including jurisdictional filters.6 
As recognised by the co-Rapporteurs in the Preliminary Explanatory 
Report, the relationship of the prospective new instrument with other international 
instruments “is one of the most difficult questions dealt with in the draft 
Convention.”7 Against this background, there is no need to emphasise the 
significance that compatibility or coordination clauses have in relation to the 
application of the prospective new Convention, bearing in mind that there are 
several international instruments with overlapping scopes of application in this 
field, along with the ever-increasing sophistication of the overall global legal 
landscape. 
The principles and rules to be applied by the courts and juridical operators in 
relation to the interface between the draft Convention and other international 
instruments is provided for in Article 24 of the May 2018 draft Convention. 
On the other hand, the relationship between the draft Convention and national 
laws is provided for in Article 16. Drawing from the extensive research 
conducted by the authors in the context of the PILIM project,8 and their 
participation in the Special Commission meetings as representatives of the 
American Association of Private International Law (ASADIP),9 the authors in 
this contribution focus on the relationship of the prospective new convention 
with existing instruments in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in Latin America.  
First, this contribution analyses conceptually the necessary coordination of 
normative frameworks in private international law in this field. Secondly, the 
platform where that coordination takes place is examined, including reference to 
the general principles of international law codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Furthermore, the concept of coordination/ compatibility 
clauses adhered to is explained and a taxonomy of coordination clauses is 
provided, before critically analysing the coordination provisions of the draft 
Convention. Against that frame of reference, the prospective “dialogue” of the 
draft Convention with the MERCOSUR legal landscape is subsequently outlined. 
Overall, this contribution argues that the maximum effectiveness principle, 
currently not explicit in the text of the draft Convention, if clearly provided for 
could facilitate the day-to-day role of judges and courts in applying the provisions of 
the Convention against a sophisticated network of 
6 Jurisdiction filters are provided for in article 5 of the Draft Convention under the 
heading of “Basis for Recognition and Enforcement”. 
7 See G. SAUMIER/F. GARCIMARTIN, Judgments Convention: Revised Preliminary 
Explanatory Report, Prel. Doc. No. 10 of May 2018, para 373. Note that this preliminary 
document was prepared based on the November 2017 draft Convention; nonetheless, the 
relevant provisions analysed in this contribution, i.e. arts. 24 (in the May 2018 draft) and 16 
remain with the same wording as in the previous draft. A further revised version of the 
preliminary explanatory report is expected for December 2018. 
8 See further http://www.pilim.law.ed.ac.uk. See also V. RUIZ ABOU-NIGM/ 
M.B. NOODT TAQUELA, Diversity and Integration in Private International Law (EUP 
forthcoming).
9 The authors have represented the American Association of Private International 
Law (ASADIP) at the last three meetings of the Special Commission.  
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international and regional instruments on international judicial co-operation. 
Ultimately, a specific means of including such a principle in the new 
prospective instrument is suggested. 
II. “The Dialogue of the Sources”10
The prospective new instrument is being designed with the potential to be adopted 
globally. Nevertheless, instruments of this kind are by definition “inchoate and 
selective”.11 Coordination between international instruments, and between them 
and national law in this field, is undoubtedly crucial, as the potential conflict 
between different and overlapping instruments is a perennial feature of private 
international law more generally, and of special importance in the field of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As explained in the Preliminary 
Explanatory Report,12 the conflict between treaties arises only if there is 
incompatibility between two treaties that are applicable in the requested court, i.e. 
the application of the two treaties must lead to different results in a concrete 
situation.13 Where there is no incompatibility, both treaties can be applied.  
Examples of coordination provisions to pre-empt and to solve these 
potential conflicts appear in many international treaties adopted under the auspices 
of The Hague Conference,14 as well as many other international instruments. These 
“coordination clauses” or “compatibility clauses” – both expressions are used 
indistinctively throughout this contribution – provide the setting for the “dialogue 
of the sources” as theorised in the well-known work of Erik Jayme.15 
10 The expression was coined by Erik JAYME in “Identité culturelle et intégration: Le 
droit international privé postmoderne”, Recueil des cours, Vol. 251 (1995), 9 et seq., paras. 
60 and 259.  
11 See the long list of matters excluded from the scope of application in art. 2 of the 
draft Convention. See further D. FRENCH/ V. RUIZ ABOU-NIGM, Jurisdiction: Betwixt 
Unilateralism and Global Coordination, in V. RUIZ ABOU-NIGM et al., Linkages and 
Boundaries in Private and Public International Law, Hart Publishing, 2018, 75-104. 
12 G. SAUMIER/F. GARCIMARTIN, Judgments Convention: Revised Preliminary 
Explanatory Report, Prel. Doc. No. 10 of May 2018, para 374. An explanation on the same 
lines is also provided in T. HARTLEY/ M. DOGAUCHI, Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague 
Choice of Court Agreements Convention, Permanent Bureau of The Hague Conference, 
2013. 
13 HARTLEY/ DOGAUCHI, (note12), 849, para 267. 
14 On compatibility clauses in HCCH conventions more generally see P. VOLKEN, 
Conflicts between Private International Law Treaties, in W.P. HEERE (ed), International 
Law and the Hague’s 75th Anniversary, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 1999, 149 and 
S. ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, Cláusulas de compatibilidad en los Convenios de la Conferencia de
La Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado, (1993) XLV Revista Española de Derecho
Internacional 1, 39.
15 E. JAYME, (note 10), paras 9 et seq., 60 and 259. 
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Jayme’s reference to a “dialogue” points to the reciprocal influences 
between the different sources, enabling the application of several sources at the 
same time, concurrently or alternatively; authorizing the choice of the parties 
between instruments; or even providing for an opt-out mechanism in favor of an 
alternative, more suitable, solution.16 For Jayme there are two main ways to resolve 
the possible conflicts generated by postmodern pluralism: the first is to give 
prominence to one source, discarding the other. That is, granting a certain 
hierarchy amongst them; the second involves seeking the co-ordination of sources.  
The latter methodology, i.e. the “dialogue of the sources”, allows for 
different normative ensembles and accommodation. Since this expression was 
coined over twenty years ago, much more sophistication in compatibility clauses 
has been introduced into modern international treaties and other instruments with 
international scopes of application, to allow further interaction between potentially 
overlapping normative layers. Nevertheless, the theory of the dialogue of the 
sources as a methodology of normative accommodation has been considered part 
of a “new general theory of law”,17 offering flexible mechanisms allowing an open 
interpretation of international treaties. Its role in facilitating the application of the 
most favourable rule to weaker parties, or the most favourable rule to enable 
international judicial cooperation, is recognised by leading scholarship.18  
In the case of several international treaties, the general framework within 
which this normative accommodation takes place is provided for in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention sets the 
international law parameters within which “coordination” or “compatibility” 
clauses included in international treaties can operate.19  
III. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Article 30 - Application of successive treaties relating to the same 
subject-matter 
16 See, C. LIMA MARQUES, Procédure civile internationale et MERCOSUR: pour un 
dialogue des règles universelles et régionales, Uniform Law Review 2003-1/2, 465 et seq., 
468.  
17 C. LIMA MARQUES, O “Diálogo das Fontes” como método da nova teoria geral do 
direito: um tributo a Erik Jayme, in C. LIMA MARQUES (coord.), Diálogo das Fontes. Do 
conflito à coordenação de normas do direito brasileiro, São Paulo, Editora Revista Dos 
Tribunais, 2012, 17, 21 and 28. 
18 See further M.B. NOODT TAQUELA, Applying the most favourable treaty or 
domestic rules to facilitate private international law co-operation, Recueil des Cours, 
vol. 377 (2016), 121-318. 
19 “Coordination clause” is the term used by A. MALAN, La concurrence des 
conventions d’unification des règles de conflit de lois, Aix-en-Provence, Presses 
Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, PUAM, 2002. 
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1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the
rights and obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating
to the same subject-matter shall be determined in accordance with
the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the
provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later
treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in
operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent
that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to
the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as
in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs
their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question
of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under
article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a
State from the conclusion or application of a treaty, the provisions of
which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State
under another treaty.
The Vienna Convention provides the general international law framework for the 
interpretation and application of international treaties irrespective of their 
substantive content.20 This Convention codifies the outer limits of interaction with 
regard to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. Indeed, article 30 
is generally regarded as stating the rules of customary international law on the 
point;21 hence its authority extends beyond the States parties to the Vienna 
Convention.  
20 J. BASEDOW, Uniform Private Law Conventions and the Law of Treaties, (2006) 
Uniform Law Review 731, 736. 
21 See, inter alia, A. REMIRO BROTÓNS, Derecho internacional, València, Tirant lo 
Blanch, 2007, 598, para. 324, who cites the case of the International Court of Justice of 17 
December 2002, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 
at 645, para. 37. See further M.G. MONROY CABRA, Interpretación de los tratados 
internacionales, in Liber Amicorum en homenaje al profesor Dr. Didier Opertti Badán, 
Montevideo, Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 2005, 685 et seq., 694 and footnote 19; 
A. AUST, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2007, 227 et seq; M.E. VILLIGER, The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties – 40 Years after, Recueil des cours, Vol. 344 (2010), 9 et seq. See also O. CORTEN,
Méthodologie du droit international public, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles,
2009,138.
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The purpose of compatibility clauses is therefore to provide, in accordance with 
the provision of 30.2 of the Vienna Convention, that in certain scenarios the 
“dialogue” should take a specific direction.22 The ever-increasing sophistication of 
these provisions23 tries to anticipate the many possible clashes between different 
provisions in practice. In the following paragraphs, conceptual remarks as well as a 
taxonomy of compatibility clauses are offered with a view to deepening the 
understanding of the full range of possibilities when it comes to drafting these 
“coordinates”. Moreover, provisions 30.3 and 30.4 of the Vienna Convention 
establish the priority of the lex posterioris as a supplementary rule of last 
resource;24 30.3 applies only to the extent that the parties to both instruments are 
the same, and 30.4 reinforces the principle of pacta sunt servanda in this context, 
i.e. the general principle of international law that underlies the entire system of
treaty-based relations between sovereign States.
IV. “Coordination Clauses” or “Compatibility
Clauses”
As Noodt Taquela explains, “the simplest and most effective method to resolve 
conflicts between treaties is to prevent conflicts from happening. Compatibility 
rules are generally perceived as a way of avoiding conflicts between international 
treaties.”25 However, the interaction of sources is rarely that simple. And the many 
instances of interface, “dialogue” and coordination between sources demand 
craftsmanship to achieve the underlying objectives of the instruments under 
consideration. A compatibility clause, according to Weckel,26 is any provision by 
which the parties make explicit the content and scope of the obligations arising 
from the agreement with respect to other treaties already existing or that may be 
concluded in the future.  
22 In the HARTLEY/ DOGAUCHI report (note12) the visualisation used is that of 
signposting, hence the reference there to “give-way” rules. We prefer the “dialogue” 
visualisation, not only because of the theorisation provided by Erik Jayme and his disciples 
(see the work of Claudia Lima Marques on this point) but also because the interaction 
between the sources may well go beyond any expected paths.  
23 See e.g. art 26 of The Hague Conference 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.  
24 See further A. SCHULZ, The Relationship between the Judgments Project and 
Other International Instruments, HCCH, Preliminary Document No. 24 of December 2003, 
prepared for the Special Commission of December 2003 on Jurisdiction, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 10, para. 24, 
available at: www.hcch.net. 
25 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note 18), para. 162, p. 208. 
26 P. WECKEL, La concurrence des traités internationaux, thèse, Université Robert 
Schuman de Strasbourg, 1989, 334.  
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For the purposes of this analysis a broad notion of “coordination clause” or 
“compatibility clause” is adopted, i.e. encompassing clauses not limited to the 
relations between treaties, and not limited to instruments referring to the same 
subject but considering the broader interaction between an international treaty and 
the legal landscape where it is expected to make an impact. In fact, a substantial 
number of conflicts in the application of treaties are due to the overlap of certain 
provisions between treaties on different subjects. For example, a treaty on 
recognition of foreign judgments may conflict with a convention on human rights, 
or provisions contained in investment treaties, or provisions included in 
international judicial cooperation instruments in general. Terminologically, 
“compatibility clauses” is the most commonly used term to refer to these clauses, 
though Roucounas27 and López Martín28 prefer the expression “relation clauses” 
and yet others, such as Malan, use “coordination clauses”.29 In this instance, the 
latter as well as “compatibility clauses” are adopted to signal the broadest 
relational conception. Such provisions are standard in The Hague 
Conference conventions of this century.
Noodt Taquela offers elsewhere a comprehensive taxonomy of these kind of 
clauses30. It goes beyond the scope of this article to engage fully with that 
classification, but for the purposes of this analysis it is useful to take recourse to 
some of the categories therein identified, i.e. the most relevant in relation to the 
impact of the prospective new Judgments Convention vis à vis the legal landscape 
in MERCOSUR countries.  
V. Different Types of Coordination Clauses
A. Maximum Effectiveness Clauses
These are clauses providing for the application of the most favourable regime; in 
other words, they are intended to prevent any interpretation of a treaty that restricts 
the advantages and preferences granted by national law or other international 
agreements. These clauses aim to ensure the priority application of the norm that is 
most suitable to achieve the purpose of a treaty; hence, they are referred to as rules 
of maximum effectiveness.31 Legal interpretation (or construction) becomes 
paramount in this context as the means to reconcile conflicting instruments.32 
27 E. ROUCOUNAS, Engagements parallèles et contradictoires, Recueil des cours, 
Vol. 206 (1987), 9 et seq.; 86 et seq.  
28 A.G. LÓPEZ MARTÍN, Tratados sucesivos en conflicto: criterios de aplicación, 
Madrid, Universidad Complutense, Servicio de publicaciones, 2002, 133 et seq.  
29 A. MALAN (note 19), 32.  
30 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note 18), para. 162, p. 208. 
31 WECKEL (note 26), 361.  
32 Ibid., 362.  
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One of the most well-known examples of a maximum efficiency clause is 
that provided for in Article VII.1 of the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,33 allowing the 
application of other existing conventions between States parties, or even the 
domestic legislation of the country where the award is relied upon, to establish 
more favourable conditions for the recognition of the award.34 
Article VII 
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the
validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to
the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where
such award is sought to be relied upon.
This kind of compatibility clause is common in international judicial 
cooperation treaties. In some of them, the most favourable rule appears explicitly.35  
A recent international convention that contains very detailed provisions on 
the relationship with other international instruments is the 2005 Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements36. The maximum efficiency principle is reflected 
in Article 26 (4):  
Article 26 Relationship with Other International Instruments […] 
(4) This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty, whether concluded before or after this Convention,
for the purposes of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a
judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Party
33 The New York Convention of 1958 has 159 States parties as of June 1st 2018. 
Information available at: http://www.uncitral.org/.  
34 See further A.J. VAN DEN BERG, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the 
International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: Explanatory Note, in 
A.J. VAN DEN BERG (ed.), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International 
Arbitration Conference, ICCA Congress Series 2009, Vol. 14, Dublin, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009, 649 et seq., and its Annex I: “Text of the Hypothetical Draft 
Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards”, 667 
et seq.  
35 See, e.g. Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign 
Public Documents, concluded in The Hague, on 5 October 1961, art. 8: “When a treaty, 
convention or agreement between two or more Contracting States contains provisions which 
subject the certification of a signature, seal or stamp to certain formalities, the present 
Convention will only override such provisions if those formalities are more rigorous than 
the formality referred to in Articles 3 and 4.”  
36 On the relationship between the prospective new instrument with the 2005 Choice 
of Court Agreements Convention see the Preliminary Explanatory Report (note12), paras 
380-386.
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to that treaty. However, the judgment shall not be recognised or 
enforced to a lesser extent than under this Convention.  
Most Inter-American Conventions on international judicial cooperation of 
application in MERCOSUR countries include a compatibility clause whereby the 
principle of maximum effectiveness extends beyond the relationship with other 
international treaties and allows for the adoption of more favourable State 
practices, in formulas such as “This Convention shall not limit any provisions 
regarding […] in bilateral or multilateral agreements that may have been signed or 
may be signed in the future by the States Parties or preclude the continuation of 
more favourable practices in this regard that may be followed by these States.”37  
However, it is interesting to note that the 1979 Inter-American Convention 
on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards,38 does not 
contain an explicit provision to that effect. Yet, the posterior 1984 Inter-American 
Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments,39 adopted in La Paz on 24 May 1984 within the 
framework of the CIDIP-III, does contain this kind of coordination clause: 
Article 8 
The rules contained in this Convention shall not limit any broader 
provisions contained in bilateral or multilateral conventions among 
the States Parties regarding jurisdiction in the international sphere or 
more favorable practices in regard to the extraterritorial validity of 
foreign judgments.  
This provision is of particular relevance to our analysis, paving the way for the 
greatest possible impact of the prospective new Judgments Convention. This kind 
of provision is also included in the Amendment to the Protocol on Judicial 
Cooperation and Assistance in Civil, Commercial, Labour and Administrative 
Matters, amongst MERCOSUR Member States, signed in Las Leñas, Argentina, 
on 27 June, 1992.40  
37 See, e.g. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, concluded in Panama, 
on 30 January 1975, within the framework of the CIDIP-I (Article 15); Inter-American 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, also adopted in Panama, on 30 January 
1975 (Article 14), and the Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive 
Measures, signed in Montevideo, on 8 May 1979, within the framework of the CIDIP-II 
(Article 18). 
38 Adopted in Montevideo on 8 May 1979 (CIDIP-II). 
39 Adopted in La Paz on 24 May 1984 (CIDIP-III). 
40 The Amendment to the Protocol of Las Leñas was adopted by the Common 
Market Council (CMC) by Decision 7/02, but to date is not in force, since it requires the 
ratification of the four States parties to the Protocol and Uruguay has not ratified it as of 
June 1st 2018. Information available at: http://www.mercosur.int.  
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Article 35 
The present Agreement does not restrict provisions of conventions 
on the same subject matter concluded earlier by the States Parties as 
far as those provisions are more favourable to the cooperation.  
The application of the most favourable treaty rule also appears in conventions 
related to other subjects, for example, human rights. This is the case of Article 29 
(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted in San José, Costa
Rica, on 22 November 1969.41
B. “Neutral” Provisions
Just as there are compatibility clauses expressly aimed at achieving maximum 
effectiveness of the instrument where they are embedded, there are other 
provisions that declare the co-existence of treaties in the absence of conflict 
between their provisions.42 This kind of provisions use formulations such as “is 
compatible with”, “it is not against”, “is without prejudice to”, “do not abrogate”, 
“shall not derogate from”, or “do not affect”. Some commentators call them 
“neutral clauses”,43 others talk of “pure compatibility clauses” and Noodt Taquela 
refers to them in her previous work as “clauses not expressly oriented in the 
direction of maximum effectiveness”.44 The draft Convention as well as the 2005 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement formulate this as a rule of 
interpretation.45 There are examples of this kind of provision in the 1965 Hague 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil or Commercial Matters (article 25),46 as well as in the 1970 Hague 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(article 32).47  
41 The American Convention on Human Rights is in force in 23 of the 35 American 
States of the Organisation of American States; United States of America and Canada are not 
party, and two States denounced the Convention: Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. 
Information available at: http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_ 
on_Human_Rights_sign.htm. Art. 29 (b) provides: “No provision of this Convention shall 
be interpreted as: […] restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom 
recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to 
which one of the said states is a party”. 
42 ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ (note 14), 49. 
43 A. AUST, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, 226 et seq.  
44 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note18), 218, para. 187. 
45 See the Preliminary Explanatory Report (note12), para 377. 
46 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters signed on 15 November 1965: 73 States parties as of June 
1st 2018. 
47 Adopted on 18 March 1970: 61 States parties as of June 1st 2018. 
María Blanca Noodt Taquela / Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 19 (2017/2018) 228 
This kind of provision in a treaty requires following the general rules of 
interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation stated in Articles 31 
and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.48 The 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides in this regard: 
Article 26. Relationship with Other International Instruments 
This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be 
compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States, 
whether concluded before or after this Convention.  
These provisions are typically not so neutral in practice, since they ultimately 
favour the realisation of the common objectives of the different international 
instruments that may be overlapping, hence, in a more nuanced manner they 
contribute to the realisation of the maximum efficiency principle.  
C. Subordination Clauses
A different kind of coordination is provided by “subordination clauses”, i.e. those 
giving priority to another previous or posterior instrument. This kind of provision 
is explicitly allowed for in Article 30 (2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Examples of international treaties providing for this sort of 
subordination clause include the 1979 Inter-American Convention on the 
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards.49 This 
international convention gives priority to the 1975 Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration,50 priority based on the subject-specific 
character of the latter. As argued by Noodt Taquela, this kind of priority of the 
special convention over a general one when the subject matter is within the remit 
of the special convention is a general principle in the “conversation” between 
international instruments, even if there is not an express rule requiring the 
subordination of the general treaty to the special one.51 Subordination clauses are 
the most common in international treaties.52 
The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements includes a 
subordination clause in: 
Article 26. Relationship with Other International Instruments 
[…]  
48 ÁLVAREZ GONZALEZ (note 14), p. 50; F. MAJOROS, Les conventions 
internationales en matière de droit privé. Abrégé théorique et traité pratique, Paris, Éditions 
A. Pedone, 1980, 66 et seq., 75 et seq.; D. BUREAU, Les conflits de conventions, Travaux du
Comité Français de Droit International Privé, 1998-2000, 201 et seq., 208.
49 Adopted in Montevideo on 8 May 1979 (CIDIP-II). 
50 Adopted in Panama on 30 January 1975 (CIDIP-I). 
51 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note 18), para 207. 
52 P. WECKEL (note 26), 343.  
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(3) This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty that was concluded before this Convention entered
into force for that Contracting State, if applying this Convention
would be inconsistent with the obligations of that Contracting State
to any non-Contracting State. This paragraph shall also apply to
treaties that revise or replace a treaty concluded before this
Convention entered into force for that Contracting State, except to
the extent that the revision or replacement creates new
inconsistencies with this Convention.
[…] 
(5) This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting
State of a treaty which, in relation to a specific matter, governs
jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments, even if
concluded after this Convention and even if all States concerned are
Parties to this Convention. This paragraph shall apply only if the
Contracting State has made a declaration in respect of the treaty
under this paragraph. In the case of such a declaration, other
Contracting States shall not be obliged to apply this Convention to
that specific matter to the extent of any inconsistency, where an
exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts, or one or
more specific courts, of the Contracting State that made the
declaration.
D. Priority Clauses
There are coordination provisions that work in the exact opposite manner to that of 
subordination clauses; these are the clauses that declare the priority of the 
instrument where they are inserted. Several Inter-American Conventions that deal 
with matters regulated by similar Hague Conventions contain compatibility clauses 
that state the priority of the former, based on the principle of regionalism (over 
universalism). One example is Article 29 of the 1989 Inter-American Convention 
on Support Obligations:53  
53 Adopted in Montevideo on 15 July 1989. The Inter-American Convention on 
Support Obligations has 13 States parties as of March 15, 2018: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. Status available on the website of the Organization of American States: 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-54.html. We would like to mention that none of 
the States parties to the Inter-American Convention had signed either the 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance 
Obligations, which is in force in 24 States, nor the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, which is in force in 15 States, mostly from Europe. 
Status of both Hague Conventions on the website of the Hague Conference: 
http://www.hcch.net.  
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Article 29 
Among Member States of the Organization of American States that 
are parties to this Convention and to the Hague Conventions of 
October 2, 1973 on the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
relating to maintenance obligations and on the law applicable to 
maintenance obligations, this Convention shall prevail. However, 
States Parties may enter into bilateral agreements to give priority to 
the application of the Hague Conventions of October 2, 1973.  
A particularly interesting example is that of Article 34 of the 1989 Inter-American 
Convention on the International Return of Children:54  
Article 34 
Among the Member States of the Organization of American States 
that are parties to this Convention and to the Hague Convention of 
October 25, 1980 on the civil aspects of international child 
abduction, this Convention shall prevail. However, States Parties 
may enter into bilateral agreements to give priority to the application 
of the Hague Convention.55  
E. Complementarity Clauses
As explained by Noodt Taquela some treaties are constructed in such a way as to 
complement another treaty; if this is the case, a compatibility clause may indicate 
54 Adopted in Montevideo, on 15 July 1989. The Inter-American Convention on the 
International Return of Children has 14 Contracting States: Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Status as to March 15, 2018, available at the 
CIDIP-IV website: http:// http:// www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-53.html. All the States 
parties to the Inter- American Convention – with the exception of Antigua and Barbuda – 
are also parties to both treaties. 
55 In spite of this subordination provision, court practice in some South-American 
States such as Argentina and Uruguay has given priority to the Hague Convention on 
Matters of Child Abduction over the Inter-American Convention. The Supreme Court of 
Argentina ruled in 2013 in a case with Mexico, - that is party to both treaties, as well as 
Argentina-, to return the child to Mexico applying the general criteria set up in relation to 
the Hague Convention where applicable to the case, despite Article 34 of the Inter- 
American Convention (Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Supreme Court of 
Argentina), 21 May 2013, F., C. del C. el G., R. T. V.D.L. s/ reintegro de hijo, available 
only in Spanish on the website of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic: 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/.) In Uruguay, the judges and the Central Authority apply the Hague 
Convention and not the Inter-American Convention, in spite of the fact that there is no 
bilateral treaty in force that gives priority to the Hague Convention. Interestingly, this 
practice is not based on the provision of the treaties themselves, as the compatibility clauses 
of these instruments do not mention State practice, as other Inter-American Conventions do 
(E Tellechea Bergman, Report, 16 May 2006). 
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the complementary nature of the instrument.56 In general, the complementary 
convention is called an Additional Protocol or another similar denomination that 
demonstrates the nature of the later convention. 
F. Incompatibility/Denunciation Clauses
For the sake of the adoption of new international instruments, States parties may 
need to compromise in relation to the adoption of future treaties. It is also possible 
that a clause requires that the States parties denounce previous treaties 
incompatible with the present treaty or request the revision of incompatible 
existing agreements.57 
G. Disconnection Clauses: Regionalism v Universalism
Finally, in so far as relevant for the analysis in this article, there are coordination 
clauses that particularly recognise the specificity of regional arrangements in 
certain circumstances. The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements provides a disconnection clause in the last paragraph of Article 26:  
Article 26 [....] 
(6) This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a
Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this
Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention
(a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is
not a Member State of the Regional Economic Integration
Organisation;
(b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as
between Member States of the Regional Economic Integration
Organisation.
The 1979 Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures58 also 
has a rule that governs its relationship with other regional integration treaties:  
Article 17 
States Parties belonging to economic integration systems or having 
common borders may agree directly among themselves upon special 
methods and procedures more expeditious than those provided for in 
56 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note 18), para 266. 
57 P. WECKEL (note 26), 349 et seq.  
58 The Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures is in force 
in 7 States: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; status 
as of March 15, 2018.  
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this Convention. These agreements may be extended to include other 
States in the manner in which the parties may agree.  
An example of the provisions mentioned in Article 17 is the one followed by three 
of the States parties of the Inter-American Convention – Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay – when these States and Brazil signed the Protocol for Provisional 
Measures of Ouro Preto, in December 1994, in the frame of MERCOSUR.59  
This outline has provided insight into the many possibilities and 
considerations that must be taken into account when considering prospectively the 
relation of the Judgments convention with other instruments in the MERCOSUR 
countries.  
VI. The Developing Coordination Provisions in the 
Draft Convention
The following paragraphs critically analyse the coordination provisions of the draft 
Convention and a new provision is suggested to furthering the overall objectives of 
the new prospective international instrument. 
A. Possibility of Application of National Law (Article 16)
The possibility of applying national law when its rules are more favourable to the 
recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments is a principle generally accepted 
in treaties on international judicial cooperation, including recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
The draft Convention currently provides: 
Article 16. Recognition or enforcement under national law 
Subject to Article 6, this Convention does not prevent the 
recognition or enforcement of judgments under national law. 
This provision is essential to understand the objective of the new prospective 
instrument, i.e. that the “draft Convention sets out a minimum standard for mutual 
recognition or enforcement of judgments, but States may go further than that 
standard.”60 It is based on the favor recognitionis principle.61 Subject to the limits 
imposed by the exclusive bases of jurisdiction provided for in article 6, the 
interaction between the draft Convention and national law can be customised for 
the benefit of the judgment-creditor.62 
59 MERCOSUR developed after the Treaty of Asunción of 1991 establishing a 
common market between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.  
60 See the Preliminary Explanatory Report (note12), paras 14, 113 and 328. 
61 Ibid, para 328. 
62 Ibid, para 329. 
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It is submitted that this provision could be better placed in Chapter III of the 
draft Convention dealing with “General Clauses” together with article 24 
(relationship with other international instruments, analysed below), taking into 
consideration that both provisions relate to the interface of the prospective 
Convention with other layers of the legal framework with which the Convention is 
expected to interact.  
B. “Dialogue of the Sources” (Article 24)
The underlying general principle is to favour compatibility: 
Article 24. Relationship with other international instruments 
1. This Convention shall be interpreted so far as possible to be
compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting States,
whether concluded before or after this Convention.
The first indent of article 24 sets the general tone of the conversation and clearly 
establishes the general aim of the “dialogue” between the sources: that of 
compatibility. That is, where a provision in the Convention is reasonably capable 
of more than one meaning, the meaning that is most compatible with the other 
treaties should be preferred.63  
This formulation has often been used in international instruments of this 
kind. The first indent of Article 26 of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, as mentioned above, is the latest example.  
C. Relation with Prior Instruments
24.2. This Convention shall not affect the application by a 
Contracting State of a treaty [or other international instrument] that 
was concluded before this Convention entered into force for that 
Contracting State [as between Parties to that instrument].  
The wording of the second indent is awaiting further discussion. The square 
brackets show where there is no consensus yet64. With this provisional wording it is 
hard to see what this first “give-way” rule, in the terms of the Preliminary 
Explanatory Report, aims to achieve. As explained in the Hartley/Dogauchi report 
in the context of the 2005 Choice of Court Agreements Convention, the question 
of determining when one treaty is prior to another raises considerable difficulties 
in international law.65 The general view is that the time of conclusion of the treaties 
in question is decisive and not their date of entry into force. Following the model 
of the 2005 Choice of Court Agreements Convention, this provision, however, 
63 Ibid, (note12), para 377. See also HARTLEY/ DOGAUCHI, (note 12), 849, 270. 
64 See further the Report from the Chair of the Informal Working Group of 22 May 
2018. 
65 HARTLEY/ DOGAUCHI (note 12), 853, 283. 
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provides a different “direction” indicating that the rule is applicable if the other 
treaty was concluded before the Convention entered into force for the State in 
question. Moreover, in the view of Hartley and Dogauchi, “if the other treaty 
complies with this rule, this rule will also apply to a new treaty that revises or 
replaces it, except to the extent that the revision or replacement creates new 
inconsistencies with the Convention”.66  
In its current version, with or without the wording in brackets, this “give-
way” rule, rather than furthering understanding of the “dialogue” between the 
sources, adds unnecessary complexity to Article 24 as a whole, and it is submitted 
that a simpler, clearer, and more succinct formulation, may better serve the interest 
of a private international law instrument of this kind. 
D. Relation with Posterior Instruments
24.3. This Convention shall not affect the application by a 
Contracting State of a treaty [or other international instrument] 
concluded after this Convention entered into force for that 
Contracting State for the purposes of obtaining recognition or 
enforcement of a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State 
that is also a Party to that instrument. [Nothing in the other 
instrument shall affect the obligations under Article 6 towards 
Contracting States that are not Parties to that instrument.]  
This second “give-way” rule is narrower than the previous one,67 i.e. the posterior 
treaty may prevail only if it deals with the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. Although the rules provided for in article 24.2 and 24.3 in the draft 
Convention seem to establish neutral coordination clauses in relation to prior or 
posterior instruments, it is submitted that a systemic interpretation of these rules 
could allow for the realisation of the maximum effectiveness principle, if 
necessary. The Preliminary Explanatory Report seems to confirm that in the 
commentary of article 24, “the procedure under one instrument could be more 
favourable than the procedure under the other instrument. The applicant seeking 
recognition and enforcement would then be entitled to use the more favourable 
process for recognition and enforcement.”68 To this effect, the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties enables the utilisation of the principle of “systemic 
integration”,69 establishing that international obligations are interpreted by 
reference to their normative environment, that is, the “system” in the words of 
Koskenniemi.70  
66 Ibid. 
67 See Preliminary Explanatory Report (note12) para 387. 
68 Ibid, para 385. Note that the Preliminary Explanatory Report further recognises in 
this context that it might be necessary to further clarify this point. 
69 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31 (3)(c). 
70 M. KOSKENNIEMI, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 25, para. 37. He refers to CH. ROUSSEAU’s 
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Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that a simpler71 and clearer provision 
could provide for that objective explicitly, and in this way contribute to attaining 
the overall goals of the Convention with much greater efficiency72.  
E. Disconnection Clause (with EU Regulations)
24.4. This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of 
a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this 
Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention as 
concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as between 
Member States of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.  
F. Priorities Enabled by Declarations?
24.[5. A Contracting State may declare that other international 
instruments listed in the declaration shall remain unaffected by this 
Convention.]  
Finally, there is no agreement to date regarding the inclusion of a further fifth 
indent allowing Contracting States to accord priority also to other international 
instruments by means of a declaration at the time of the adoption of the 
Convention. In general, declarations of this kind are less than ideal, as they detract 
from the harmonised level playing field in terms of minimum standards that the 
draft Convention aims to achieve.  
Yet, as is well known, many of the provisions of a multilateral instrument 
of this sort are the result of compromises necessary to achieve consensus as to the 
desirability of the international instrument as a whole. Article 26 of the Choice of 
Court Agreements Convention, on which various of the provisions of Article 24 
have been modeled, provide the possibility of “give-way” rules by means of a 
declaration in relation to specific matters. Nevertheless, from a purely technical 
perspective the proposed fifth indent, still in square brackets, should rather be 
avoided. 
words related to the duties of a judge in his classical article on Treaty Conflict published in 
1932 (De la compatibilité des normes juridiques contradictoires dans l’ordre international, 
Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 39 (1932), 133,153): “lorsqu’il est en 
présence de deux accords de volontés divergentes, il doit être tout naturellement porté à 
rechercher leur coordination plutôt qu’à consacrer à leur antagonisme”. 
71 It cannot be overemphasized how important simplicity is for the final wording of 
these provisions. Simplicity and accessibility of the rule are of the essence for provisions 
dealing with issues that are inherently and technically complex. The instrument should be 
able to facilitate normative accommodation and effectiveness of the respective instruments 
rather than adding an extra layer of difficulty. 
72 Efficiency is key to a successful system for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters (see Preliminary Explanatory report 
(note12) para 14). 
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VII. What is Missing in the Draft Convention?
It is submitted that the explicit inclusion of a provision indicating the maximum 
efficiency principle explained above would be a welcome addition. The maximum 
effectiveness principle is paramount in relation to the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments. Ferenc Majoros defined the principle of maximum 
effectiveness as the rule of conflict of conventions according to which between 
two or more conflicting provisions, taking into account the matters governed, the 
one that allows for the most effective way to meet the objectives of the 
conventions in conflict should prevail.73 Majoros explained that one of the subject 
matters which must follow the principle of maximum effectiveness is recognition 
of foreign judgments, because it is fair and logical that once a judgment seeks 
recognition and/or enforcement in a country that is bound to the terms of several 
treaties in relation to the country of origin of the judgment, recognition and 
enforcement should follow the most favourable conditions and the simplest and 
most efficient procedures.74 
This issue has been analysed in relation to the recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards, applying the following provision of the New York Convention of 1958.  
“Article VII. 1: 
The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity 
of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting 
States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to 
avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent 
allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is 
sought to be relied upon.” 
According to Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman, this provision allows for the 
concurrent application of provisions included in different normative instruments, 
provided that the ensemble between them is most favourable to the recognition of 
the foreign arbitral award.75  
Normative accommodation processes, i.e., the “dialogue of the sources”, 
require adaptability and are, by definition, dynamic and at times open-ended. 
Hence, general principles of interpretation, such as the first paragraph of Article 24 
of the draft Convention, go much further in facilitating this “dialogue” than the 
“give-way” rules as presently drafted. Along the same lines, a more explicit 
enunciation of the maximum effectiveness principle can further the objectives of 
international treaties in the field of recognition and enforcement considered as a 
73 B. DUTOIT/ F. MAJOROS, Le lacis des conflits de conventions en droit privé et leurs 
solutions possibles, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1984, 565 et seq. and 577 et seq.  
74 Ibid., 565 et seq. and 577 et seq. 
75 E. GAILLARD/ J. SAVAGE (eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard B. Goldman, On International 
Commercial Arbitration, The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1999, paragr. 271, 137; see also 
J.D.M. LEW, L.A. MISTELIS, S.M. KRÖLL, Comparative International Commercial
Arbitration, Kluwer, 2003, Chapter 26, 697, para. 34.
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whole, i.e. to favour the freer circulation of judgments across national frontiers. In 
other words, to accommodate the discrepancies of rule-based systems, the 
craftsmanship of the judiciary is necessary, and their role is facilitated by clear 
guidelines that can be given by means of principles that emphasise the treaty’s 
overall objectives. Priority rules may not be the most appropriate to accommodate 
overlapping and inconsistent rules; the malleability of principles may prove more 
appropriate to soften the edges, to fill the gaps, and ultimately to realise the 
objectives of international recognition and enforcement as much as possible in the 
required scenario. 76  
It is submitted, therefore, that two core guiding principles can go a long 
way in facilitating normative accommodation in this field: “systemic coordination” 
and “maximum effectiveness”, being possible to reduce these two to one formula: 
in pursuit of systemic coordination towards maximum effectiveness of the foreign 
judgment in the country of recognition and enforcement. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the favor recognitionis principle could be 
expressly stated in the context of the relationship with other Conventions on the 
following lines: 
This Convention shall not affect the application by a Contracting 
State of a treaty or other international instrument, whether concluded 
before or after this Convention, that provides for more favourable 
rules for the purposes of obtaining recognition or enforcement of a 
judgment given by a court of a Contracting State that is also a Party 
to that treaty. Nothing in the other instrument shall affect the 
obligations under Article 6 towards Contracting States that are not 
Parties to that instrument. 
In any case, it is understood that the facilitation of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments favors the judgment-creditor, yet there is a risk of affecting 
the interests of the judgment-debtor if due process is not respected.77 Hence, the 
principles of interpretation in favour of compatibility and maximum 
effectiveness should always be coupled with the necessary safeguards to guarantee 
the rights of access to justice and to a fair trial. 
76 Ruiz Abou-Nigm discusses the suitability of general principles in the field of 
jurisdiction to achieve desired results in terms of “justice” and “systemic coherence” 
elsewhere (See D. FRENCH/ V. RUIZ ABOU-NIGM (note11), 75-104). 
77 M.B. NOODT TAQUELA (note 18), 302, para. 363. 
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VIII. The Draft
Convention and the MERCOSUR Legal 
Landscape
There are several multilateral treaties on recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in force in the MERCOSUR States and in other Latin-American 
countries. The 1992 Protocol of Las Leñas on Co-operation and Jurisdictional 
Assistance in Civil, Commercial and Administrative Matters was adopted within 
the framework of MERCOSUR and it is in force between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay.78 The 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards,79 is in force in ten Latin-
American countries, included the four original States of the MERCOSUR 
Agreement. In addition, the 1940 Montevideo Treaty on International Civil 
Procedure Law, which also governs recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, applies between Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The latter provides, 
in addition to the traditional conflicts rule to govern the procedure, a material 
provision that provides for a more favourable procedure for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments (article 7).80  
In relation to the interaction between these overlapping international 
treaties, the established practice followed by Uruguayan courts allows the 
judgment creditor to seek enforcement under the Inter-American Convention or the 
Las Leñas Protocol provisions, combining them with the most favourable 
procedure provided for in the 1940 Montevideo Treaty. Uruguayan scholars and 
courts have established the “survival” of Article 7 of the 1940 Montevideo Treaty 
that provides for a specific (more expeditious) proceeding for enforcement before 
local judges or lower tribunals. In Uruguay, that practice is used instead of having 
recourse to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the otherwise designated tribunal 
for seeking recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments81. This interesting 
78 S.J. BATTELLO, Reconocimiento de sentencias extranjeras en el derecho brasileño: 
los cambios producidos por el MERCOSUR, Revista del Derecho del Comercio 
Internacional Temas y Actualidades DeCITA, 04.2005, 496 et seq.; M.B. NOODT TAQUELA/ 
G. ARGERICH, Dimensiones institucional y convencional de los sistemas de reconocimiento
de los Estados mercosureños, in D.P. FERNÁNDEZ ARROYO (coord.), Derecho Internacional
Privado de los Estados del Mercosur, Buenos Aires, Zavalía, 2003, paras. 406 et seq, 441
et seq.
79 Signed in Montevideo on 8 May 1979 (CIDIP-II). 
80 Article 7 provides: “La ejecución de las sentencias y de los fallos arbitrales, así 
como la de las sentencias de tribunales internacionales, contempladas en el último inciso 
del art. 5, deberá pedirse a los jueces o tribunales competentes, los cuales, con audiencia 
del Ministerio Público, y previa comprobación que aquéllos se ajustan a lo dispuesto en 
dicho artículo, ordenarán su cumplimiento por la vía que corresponda, de acuerdo con lo 
que a ese respecto disponga la ley de procedimiento local.” […] 
81 As provided for in the relevant provisions of the national law in Uruguay, that is, 
the Uruguayan General Code of Procedure of 1988 (Ley No. 15.982/1988), article 541. The 
text with amendments is available – only in Spanish – on the website of the Uruguayan 
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normative accommodation gives the chance to request recognition of judgments 
rendered in Argentina or Paraguay, both States parties to the 1940 Montevideo 
Treaty, directly in the lower courts.82 
The possibility of having recourse to this more favourable rule 
and interpreting the interface of overlapping international treaties as compatible, 
with a view to further more efficient enforceability, should not be affected by 
the new prospective Judgments Convention. The legal basis for this interpretation 
in favour of compatibility is aligned with the principle provided for in 
article 24.1 of the draft Convention as already discussed above. In fact, the 
draft Convention states that the procedure for recognition and enforcement 
of the foreign judgment is governed by the law of the requested State 
unless the Convention provides otherwise.83 Hence, there is no reason  
why the specific procedure for enforcement before local judges or lower 
tribunals in Uruguay provided for by article 7 of the 1940 Montevideo Treaty 
should not continue to “survive”.  
Another example of the coordination of different sources on the lines of the 
interpretation provision provided for in article 24.1 of the draft Convention is a 
decision rendered by the Uruguayan courts when the Brazilian Court of Passo 
Fundo, Rio Grande do Sul, requested provisional measures in relation to property 
located in Uruguay. The Uruguayan court of first instance granted the attachment 
of property (the provisional measure) but denied the final enforcement of the 
foreign judgment, on the grounds that the requirements for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments had not been completely fulfilled. The 
Uruguayan Court of Appeal confirmed the decision based on the joint application 
to the case of the 1979 Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of 
Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, the 1992 Protocol of Las Leñas, and the 
bilateral treaty between Brazil and Uruguay on Judicial Co-operation in Civil, 
Commercial, Labour and Administrative Matters, signed in Montevideo on 28 
December 1992, as well as the General Code on Procedure of Uruguay.84  
IX. Operating in Realistic Contexts
Practitioners claim that for private international law to play a meaningful role in 
the resolution of modern transnational disputes, it must “stop worrying about 
Parliament: http//www.parlamento.gub.uy/htmlstat/pl/codigos/EstudiosLegislativos/Codigo 
GeneraldeProceso2014-03.pdf. 
82 See E. VESCOVI, Derecho Procesal Civil Internacional. Uruguay, el Mercosur y 
América, Montevideo, Ediciones Idea, 2000, 181. 
83 Art 14 Draft Convention. 
84 Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Civil de Segundo Turno (Uruguay), 19 April 2006, 
No. 9999-3-2004. See further M.B. NOODT TAQUELA, (note18), 205-206, para. 159. 
María Blanca Noodt Taquela / Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 19 (2017/2018) 240 
mechanical methods and grammatical texts and rather begin operating in realistic 
contexts.”85  
From this more practical perspective, there are undoubtedly several other 
issues that would affect the impact of the prospective new convention. This 
contribution is mainly focused on the interaction with other instruments, but this is 
one aspect, and by no means the only important one considering the eventual 
impact of the future convention. For the sake of providing a broader picture, the 
analysis that follows very briefly addresses two additional issues, one procedural, 
and one substantive: both must be regarded as central to an impact assessment of 
the future convention. These are, first, the requirement or not of legalisation; and 
second, the dramatic importance of the extent of the public policy exception as a 
ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The legal 
landscape of the MERCOSUR countries offers interesting angles in relation to 
both these issues. 
A. Legalisation
Legalisation describes the procedures by which the signature and the seal on a 
public document are certified as authentic by a series of public officials along a 
“chain”, to a point where the ultimate authentication is readily recognised by an 
official of the State of destination and can be given legal effect there. This official 
is the Consul of the State of destination accredited to the State of origin who is 
ideally situated to facilitate this process.86 Some States require a further 
authentication by the Foreign Ministry of State of destination, to verify the 
signature of the Consul. 
Abolishment of the requisite of legalisation was contemplated under a 
previous draft (Draft Convention of February 2017),87 but this proposal was 
abandoned due to the opposition of several Members to this procedural 
simplification during the November 2017 meeting of the Special Commission. 
Hence, the draft Convention of May 2018 does not provide for an exemption in 
relation to the general requirement of legalisation. However, looking at the 
interface of the draft Convention with the legal landscape in the MERCOSUR 
countries, the exemption from legalisation provided for in many regional and 
bilateral instruments of the latter may apply under the principle of the most 
favourable rule. Exemption from legalisation is provided for in the 1992 Las Leñas 
85 C.T. KOTUBY JR, General Principles of Law, International Due Process and the 
Modern Role of Private International Law, (2013) 23 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, 411 at 412. 
86 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Permanent Bureau, A 
Handbook on the Practical Operation of the Apostille Convention, 2013.  
87 The February 2017 draft included article 19, in the following terms: “All 
documents forwarded or delivered under this Convention shall be exempt from legalisation 
or any analogous formality, including an Apostille”. This provision is no longer part of the 
draft Convention.  
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Protocol: under article 26 of the Protocol, the documents transmitted through 
Central Authorities are exempt from authentication or similar formality.88 
B. Public Policy
The draft Convention mentions public policy as a ground for refusal of recognition 
or enforcement under article 7.1(c)  
Article 7. Refusal of recognition or enforcement 
1. Recognition or enforcement may be refused if […]– (c)
recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with
the public policy of the requested State, including situations where
the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible
with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State and
situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty of that
State.
The provision reflects the exceptional and narrow concept of public policy, 
including procedural infringements of due process. This narrow concept of public 
policy is in line with the established concept of “international public policy” as 
defined in the Uruguayan Declaration to the 1979 Inter-American Convention on 
General Rules of Private International Law89 as “an exceptional authorisation to the 
various States Parties to declare in a non-discretionary and well-founded 
manner” whenever the foreign judgment “manifestly offend the standards and 
principles essential to the international public order on which each individual State 
bases its legal individuality”.90 
It is regrettable that the draft Convention provision includes in fine 
“situations involving infringements of security or sovereignty of that State”. It is 
submitted that this wording unnecessarily broadens the concept of the public 
policy exception, contrary to the overall Convention’s objectives. This wording 
was between brackets in the preliminary draft of the working group and also in the 
draft Convention of February 2017, but the brackets were deleted during the third 
meeting of the Special Commission.  
88 Las Leñas Protocol is in force in the four original States of the MERCOSUR: 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The text of the Protocol in Portuguese and 
Spanish, as well as its status, is available on the MERCOSUR website: 
http://www.mercosur.int. 
89 1979 Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law 
(CIDIP-II). 
90 Uruguay Declaration to the Inter-American Convention on General Rules of 
Private International Law of 1979. Available on: www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-
45.html. See generally, C. FRESNEDO DE AGUIRRE, Public Policy: Common Principles in the 
American States, Recueil des Cours, vol. 379 (2016), 73.  
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X. Conclusions
This contribution reflects on the latest draft of The Hague Conference Judgments 
Convention, that of May 2018. The Convention is envisaged as a mechanism 
providing for the free circulation of judgments globally. The greater or lesser 
success of this prospective new Convention does not depend only on the intrinsic 
technical and political value of the new international instrument itself. Of great 
importance is how the prospective instrument will fit into any given 
legal landscape in order to provide maximum efficiency when it comes to 
the recognition of foreign judgments in the jurisdiction where recognition 
and/or enforcement is sought.  
This analysis has sought to provide an assessment of the coordination 
provisions in the draft Convention. “Coordination clauses” or “compatibility 
clauses” are the simplest and most effective method to resolve conflicts between 
treaties. This contribution adopted the broadest conception of this notion, 
encompassing clauses not limited to the relations between treaties, and not limited 
to instruments referring to the same subject, but considering the broader interaction 
between an international treaty and the legal landscape where it is expected to 
make an impact. Among the different types of coordination clauses, the “maximum 
effectiveness clauses” and the so-called “neutral clauses” – not so neutral in 
practice – are of great importance in the analysis of the draft Convention. It is 
submitted that a systemic interpretation of these rules may lead to the application 
of the maximum effectiveness principle examined in this contribution, but that it 
would be more conducive to achieving the overall effects of the Convention to 
adopt a simpler and clearer provision to that effect in article 24, as suggested 
above91, and explicitly provide for the principle of maximum effectiveness.  
The new prospective instrument is sought as a minimum basis to allow for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the Contracting Parties in 
line with instruments of this kind in analogous fields, such as the 1958 New York 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, as well 
as the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements. Therefore, a 
clearer wording for article 24 could enhance the understanding of its intended 
effects and possibly contribute to a more expeditious path to approval, adoption 
and subsequent ratification of the new prospective instrument, in time, facilitating 
the day-to-day role of judges and courts in applying the provisions of the 
Convention against an over-increasingly sophisticated network of international 
instruments on international judicial co-operation.  
91 See supra page 238. 
